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Australian labour set out on a grand attempt to restructure vocational education and 
training in the 1980s and 1990s. The reforms were intended to go beyond the scope of 
previous worker education by aiming at complete systemic change by linking skill 
development to wages through the award system.  
 
This paper locates labour’s training reform in the wider program of economic 
modernisation. It argues that unions provided the inspiration for the new system but by 
the early 1990s had lost the initiative as enterprise bargaining was introduced and as 
employer associations and state education bureaucracies re-asserted control and 
established a new training market.  
 
That training reform’s original expectations were not delivered demands closer attention 
and analysis. Learning the lessons of this experiment is an essential step for labour in 





When Australia’s National Training Authority (ANTA) embarked on its consultation 
for the third national strategy for vocational education and training (VET) in 2003 one 
principle was taken for granted. VET is to continue to be 'industry- led', because 
'Industry leadership is critical, (it is) a deliberate and distinctive characteristic of our 
national system.’ (ANTA, 6)  
 
This central underlying principle is now almost unchallenged and is supported by peak 
education and training bodies, state governments, business groups and key university 
VET research centres. In its own way the ACTU, (Australian Council of Trade Unions) 
despite misgivings about the administration of training and its sidelining from policy 
input since the election of the Howard government in the mid 1990s, also endorsed this 





But that is a far cry from the early days of training reform when trade unions provided 
the inspiration for the reforms implemented by Labor governments between 1983 and 
1996. Then the labour movement, and the union movement in particular set out to 
restructure the entire vocational training system and to tie the changes to the industrial 
award system. This was achieved by linking skills and qualifications to award 
classifications. Whereas trade unions had in the past concentrated on setting up 
education programs and institutions that focussed on the trade union training, cadre 
training or workers education, training reform under Labor in the 1980s and 1990s 
aimed at complete systemic change.i (Boughton 1997, Brown 2003, Ewer et al 1991, 
Taksa 2003) 
 
How then did this shift come about? This paper examines key turning points from when 
labour was shaping the restructuring of post school education and training to today’s 
situation where industry’s influence is seemingly hegemonic. It begins by briefly 
locating training reform in labour’s wider agenda of modernising the Australian 
economy. It then considers training reform in three phases of union leadership through 
development, ebb and wane. Unions hoped that their interpretation of ‘industry’, which 
they understood to mean tripartite arrangements, would survive. Instead as business and 
the education bureaucracies asserted their influence ‘industry’ has come to be 
synonymous with ‘business’. The paper draws on the experiences and reflections of a 
number of union officials who were instrumental in implementing training reform 
policies and who were members of national tripartite committees and inquiries. The 
paper concludes with an assessment of labour’s experiment. 
 
Methodology 
The data collected for this paper is drawn from a wider study into the labour 
movement’s expectations and assessment of training reform under the Labor 
governments of Bob Hawke and Paul Keating. Structured interviews were conducted 
with seventeen key labour movement figures around a series of critical incidents.  
 
Of the seventeen, sixteen were trade union officials during the training reform period. 
The other was a Federal Minister in the Hawke and Keating Labor governments 
between 1990-1996, including periods as a Minister with Education responsibilities and 
for a time a member of Cabinet. Those interviewed were chosen because of their 
involvement in the union movement’s development of training reform policies and 
strategies or because they were members of senior union bodies involved in education 
and/or industry restructuring. Some worked on the major restructured awards of the 
time (for instance the Metal Industry Award, the Child Care Award, the Textile, 
Clothing and Footwear Award), participated on the Australia Reconstructed study tour, 
on national or industry education bodies, or were responsible for educating other 
unionists about the training reform agenda. All had the benefit of hindsight and were 
being asked to reflect on the expected benefits more than ten years later. 
 
The interviewees came from blue and white collar work areas. Two worked at the Trade 
Union Training Authority, one for the ACTU and another for a State Labor Council. 
Two were ACTU Executive members. Four worked at the metalworkers union 




were interviewed, and more people associated with the ‘left’ (11 with clear allegiances) 
in union factional terms than from the ‘right’ (2).  
 
Following each interview a full transcript was made and returned to the interviewees 
who were then invited to make any alterations, amendments or corrections they felt 
would better reflect their understanding and position. It is these ‘corrected’ transcripts 
that form the basis of the material referred to here.  
 
What then is involved in this approach? The interviews sought to develop a story of the 
evolution of training reform and restructuring from the point of view of a group of 
union officials closely involved with policy development and implementation. It is not 
intended to be a definitive story. The research is an attempt to draw together different 
experiences and perspectives so that a richer picture of labour’s training reform 
experiment can be examined. It aims to transform the various accounts into an 
‘interpretive one in search of meaning’ (Geertz 1975, 5) is the intention of constructing 
history that serves the collective purpose of better understanding that history in order to 
avoid the pitfalls and disappointments encountered in the 1980s and 1990s and to be 
better prepared for future interventions. 
 
Shaping national advantage 
 
The main education priorities of the Whitlam and first Hawke governments were 
focussed on schools and universities. It was not until the mid 1980s that a number of 
key unions and the ACTU began to see vocational education as an important part of 
Australia’s education system.  
 
Across the labour movement’s political spectrum it was accepted that the movement’s 
survival, and the living standards of those they represented, depended on making 
Australian capitalism more modern, technologically responsive and internationally 
competitive. A restructured education and training system, based on competency 
standards, would contribute to each of these goals and improve the prospects of 
individuals through investments in their human capital.  These assumptions, shared by 
other social democratic governments around the world, were interwoven through the 
strategies and policy developments of Labor’s terms in office. (Coates 2000) 
 
Labour saw the potential for linking education and training with industrial relations and 
work reorganisation. It was seen as the linchpin in improving workers living standards 
and in entrenching unions’ position in society, in overcoming declining trade union 
membership, and in redressing the ‘export’ of jobs from the industrialised to the newly 
industrialising nations.  
 
By the early 1990s the collection of reports, new institutions, bureaucratic structures 
and national agreements had been brought together under an all-embracing umbrella 
known as the ‘national training reform agenda’. Trade unions and government devoted 
enormous attention and human resources to reshape vocational education and training 






As Labor’s education policies evolved and expanded to embrace vocational education 
and training along with school and university education, trade unionists became 
prominent as promoters and leaders of reform. They sat on, or chaired, bodies such as 
the National Board of Employment, Education and Training (NBEET), the Employment 
and Skills Formation Council (ESFC), the Schools Council (SC), the Higher Education 
Council (HEC), the National Training Board (NTB), the Standards and Curriculum 
Council (SCC) and the Australian National Training Authority (ANTA). The training 
reform agenda became one of the foundations of the agreement between Labor and the 
ACTU.  
 
The advocates of this reform strategy, built around what was to become known as a 
high wage / high skill strategy, contrasted their position with what they identified as 
Australian labour’s traditional ‘labourist’ orientation, an orientation they identified as 
being the dominant trend in Australian labour history. (Ewer et al 1991) They saw 
labourism as a narrowly focussed, economistic view of what workers and workers' 
organisations could achieve under capitalism. Offering no challenge to the system of 
exploitation, labourism identified unions’ role as being primarily concerned with the 
bread and butter issues of obtaining wage rises and defending working conditions. This 
view they contrasted with a more modern expression of labour’s ‘radical’ tradition that 
now included social and economic policies. Industry policy, investment, welfare, 
superannuation, education and training, in addition to wages policy, were features of 
this new agenda. 
 
Both wings of the labour movement were interested in this but the political and 
intellectual impetus for training reform came from within the unions, and especially 
those unions associated with the Communist Party and the left of the ALP.   
 
Australia’s new Labor government in 1983 saw economic policy as having one central 
question: how should national (or regional) competitiveness be created and maintained? 
Everything else - from macroeconomic policies to strategies for training and welfare - 
flowed from this question. 
 
According to this view, it was imperative to have a strategic trade policy to get new 
products developed and into markets as quickly as possible. Since technological change 
is a continual process of building up technical skills, capacity and entrepreneurship, a 
‘technological dynamism’ needed to be nourished. Education and technological 
innovation became critical to the process. (Albo 1997) 
 
In the absence of a modernising capitalist class the task fell to the forward looking, 
nation-building social democrats allied in both the political and industrial wings through 
the Accord. This new relationship provided the opportunity for Labor to shape 
Australia’s advantage in a way that had not occurred since the Second World War.  
 
A three-cornered policy involving progressive competitiveness, shared austerity, and 
international coordination was developed in keeping with the idea of shaped advantage. 
The progressive competitiveness strategy emphasised the effects of external constraints 
imposed by the new ‘globalisation’.ii The argument went that in a globalised market a 




international trade and exchange. But what distinguishes one economy from another are 
the skills of its labour force and the nature of workplace relations. Training policies 
should, therefore, be the central component of a jobs and welfare strategy, while 
relationships of ‘trust’ and co-operation should be fostered within enterprises. This 
approach permeated the training and workplace reform agenda.   
 
The shared austerity strategy stressed the internal constraints necessary to foster 
growth. Full employment required restraint on workers’ pay and consumption to keep 
exports competitive, investment high, and the state’s budget under control. The role of 
an incomes policy was to spread work through wage restraint and keep unit labour costs 
down for exports. The Prices and Incomes Accord was the overarching policy 
framework for this approach. 
 
Thirdly, international coordination relied on a Keynesian-style approach, which 
maintained that removing constraints on the market required the political will to shift 
expansionary policies from the national to the supranational level. What was needed, 
according to this view, was international co-ordination of economic policy. A 
‘cosmopolitan democracy’ imposed on global governance structures would legitimate 
that kind of international co-ordination, while leaving questions of internal democracy 
to the ruling regimes of the region. Australia’s regional approach was focused on bi-
lateral trading relations with countries such as Indonesia and Japan and on developing 
new multi- lateral agreements such as APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation). 
 
Labor’s leaders, most effectively Paul Keating, successfully corralled their opponents to 
accept a simple alternative. Either they were for the future or the past. 
 
 
The ebb and flow of training reform 
 
The history of training reform under Labor falls into three phases. The first, from the 
mid-1980s, is one of ascendancy as the trade unions laid the groundwork and seized the 
initiative.  Julius Roe, Assistant General Secretary of the AMWUiii and the ACTU’s 
nominee on the National Training Board, gave four reasons in 1995 why unions 
supported training reform, 
 
• the increasing openness of the Australian economy to the world, [meant] that a 
competitive economy should adopt a high skill / high wage path to build a high 
quality infrastructure, 
• because the nature and quality of available education and training needed to 
change to meet the imperatives of a new labour force and economy, 
• access to education and training was highly inequitable and workplace change had 
the potential to increase this inequity without union intervention. A more open 
economy meant greater labour mobility [raising] the need for a national system of 
skill and qualifications recognition. A tripartite, industry determined set of 
standards for the performance of work was developed to meet this need, 
• education and training [is] a means of challenging the ideological drive for market 
relations to determine the future shape of education and training through 





By the early 1990s employer associations and the education bureaucracy, especially in 
the state government departments, began to wrest back control of the training agenda, a 
momentum that has accelerated since 1996. But it was the rise of enterprise bargaining 
in 1991-92, the ALP government’s promotion of it and unions’ acceptance of it, which 
is most strongly identified by the interviewed union officials as the cause of labour’s 
steady decline through the later 1990s. It is this latter period of labour’s waning 
influence that is the main focus of this paper. 
 
The first restructured award approved by the Industrial Commission was the Metal 
Industry Award and it did not take force until March 1990. The insertion of a new 
Clause 6c formalised the link between award restructuring and training at an industry 
level and was a landmark in the evolution of the training reform agenda. In it the parties 
‘recognised that in order to increase the efficiency, productivity and international 
competitiveness of industry, a greater commitment to training and skill development is 
required.’  
 
Metalworker officials believed that the next milestone would be achieved by making 
paid training leave an award provision. The expectation was that like previous changes 
to the Metal Industry award inserting a paid training leave clause would eventually flow 
on to awards in other industries. The AMWU was engaged in an industrial dispute over 
the paid training leave issue and was preparing to take strike action to win its demand. 
At the same time a new Accord VI had been re-negotiated in the run-up to the 1990 
Federal election and it introduced elements of enterprise bargaining alongside award 
restructuring. Chris Lloyd and Peter Ewer were AMWU national research officers and 
they believed the union was in a very strong position to win on the training leave issue 
when it was put on hold by the union’s leaders until after the election.  
 
The decision to suspend the campaign triggered a split among the union’s officers. For 
Lloyd the issue was crystal clear, ‘The whole thing that tied unions to the Training 
Reform agenda was awards. Awards were supposed to enshrine the agenda… The 
unions lost any ability to play in the Training Reform agenda the minute they embraced 
enterprise bargaining, because the whole principle was to go across awards…Once you 
separate awards from the agenda, unions are out of it they’ve got no purpose. Really, its 
that simple.’  (Lloyd 1997, 21-22) 
 
Julius Roe saw it differently. Adopting a position that emphasised the unions’ weakness 
in the face of the employers’ restructuring he found it ‘difficult to see an alternative 
strategy… One alternative strategy some people suggested [was to] retain a centralised 
wage system and not allow this bargaining at enterprise level. Well my experience was 
that even before we moved away from a centralised system employers were faced with 
globalisation, were restructuring at a local level and because our focus was on the 
centralised system we weren’t in any way able to intervene in that process of 
restructuring. It was management led, management dominated, we responded to it, 
sometimes we responded with resistance, but generally when it comes to those things 
management has completely the upper hand. At least through our agenda when they 
look at restructuring in manufacturing they have to look at things like education and 




been restructuring. That means it’s had some positives as well as some negatives, but I 
certainly wouldn’t suggest that the outcomes have all been positive at the enterprise 
level.’ (Roe 1997, 15)  
 
Don Sutherland, an educator with the Trade Union Training Authority (TUTA) agreed 
that ‘unions were under attack and the degree of energy that they could apply to the 
process was weakened. We just couldn’t bring the force to bear to maintain direction 
and that’s signalled in the compromises we were prepared to make about enterprise 
level training and the semi-deregulation of credentialing and standards setting and so 
on.’ (Sutherland 1996, 15) Roe’s and Sutherland’s assessments are in contrast to the 
position that unions were setting the agenda and ‘driving change’. 
 
What started as an internal dispute within the AMWU over the pre-election decision to 
suspend the industrial campaign came into the open with the publication of an interview 
in Australian Left Review. In the interview Lloyd and Ewer argued that their union 
leadership’s acceptance of enterprise bargaining would destroy award restructuring. 
(Curran 1991) In going public they broke the accepted AMWU behaviour of keeping 
disputes in-house and knew that their action would invite retribution and intimidation. It 
came swiftly and before the interview even saw the light of day in George Campbell’s 
denunciation in The Weekend Australian. He claimed that the criticisms had no support 
and that if Lloyd cared to debate it he would ‘...crunch him into the ground’ (Hannan 
1990) 
 
The tide for labour’s training reform began to turn around 1991 and 1992. In October 
1991 the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) approved Enterprise 
Bargaining as a new wage principle and in 1992 the Industrial Relations Act was 
amended to provide for decentralised bargaining. It sapped Ewer’s commitment and 
ended the self-described ‘Accord apparatchik’s belief that the Accord and award 
restructuring could deliver the benefits he and his colleagues had hoped for. ‘When 
enterprise bargaining was launched onto an unsuspecting public by the Federal cabinet 
and the ACTU in 1991, that was when I basically had had enough of Accord politics.’ 
(Ewer 1997, 1) 
 
It wasn’t that enterprise bargaining coincided with training reform’s decline, according 
to Lloyd, rather enterprise bargaining was the cause. ‘If you think award restructuring is 
a complex thing that requires ten years to put in place, giving it one year and then 
bringing in a system that’s completely the opposite is bound to destroy it, isn’t it?’ 
(Lloyd 1997, 22) 
 
Other union officials highlighted the negative impact of the introduction of enterprise 
bargaining at the workplace. Jack was a national trainer with the metalworkers and had 
for many years before been a shop steward and official at Sydney’s Cockatoo 
Dockyard. ‘These new terminologies creep in like ‘the enterprise’. Now if I, and 
workers, continually refer to the enterprise then they become part of it. And you are not 
arguing about better wages and conditions you start sitting around a table talking about 
the poor boss and the state of their profits. So the enterprise can be used to disarm 




whatsoever. But the ‘employer’ is still there and that’s a far stronger word and if that 
kind of word is used then people know where they stand. ‘ (Jack 1997, 11)  
 
Lindsay Benfell also worked in the metal industry but was employed by the Electrical 
Trades Union (ETU). He thought that enterprise bargaining ‘actually even made it 
worse, because people are being trained for the needs of the enterprise, they’re much 
more focused on the welfare of the enterprise. Before, tradespeople, see their skills to be 
portable and they assume they [can] go from one industry to the next and there’s no 
great drama. But once you start focusing on the enterprise and all the training is focused 
on the enterprise, people would have a smaller perspective of the world rather than an 
expanded one (…) The way the Training Reform agenda has been addressed here, 
actually conspires against a better understanding and a better ability to fight against 
privatisation and deregulation.’ (Benfell 1997, 6) 
 
The contradiction was also evident to those outside the industrial wing of the 
movement, who could recognise a transfer in workers’ allegiance arising from the shift 
to an enterprise focus. A Cabinet Minister in the Hawke and Keating governments noted 
that ‘much of this enterprise based culture and industrial relations and training reform at 
the enterprise level does seem to envisage a greater sense of commitment by the 
workforce to the particular enterprise rather than to the working class.’ (Min 1996, 10) 
 
By 1992-93 trade union leadership of training reform was over and a new training 
industry was replacing the unions’ influence. As union influence fell away control 
returned to the education bureaucracy, and employer associations became more 
influential. Labor Education Minister John Dawkins’ intention of creating an ‘open 
training market’ was being consolidated. On some important issues unions had turned a 
blind eye to the implications of introducing a market into what had traditionally been a 
regulated, public sector industry and this left many ill-equipped to respond to the new 
arguments of business and the economic rationalist inspired public service policy 
makers. Ewer describes a situation where union officials were reluctant to closely 
examine the rhetoric around an ‘industry responsive VET system’ for fear of 
uncovering a reality that did not accord with their own rhetoric. This reluctance was 
compounded by an unfounded bravado about how unions would dictate how the new 
system would operate.  
 
‘In 1987, we did not properly unpack the code about an industry responsive VET 
system. See that was the rhetoric, it wasn’t about a market-based approach as it is now, 
that rhetoric was not explicit then, it was all about making it responsive to industry and 
that industry was us, the training system was going to be responsive to us, not to the 
employers. We were going to tell it what it needed to do and then it was going to do it 
and the employers were going to have to get used to it.’ (Ewer 1997, 9) Instead 
something quite different unfolded. 
 
Many union officials believed that the employers had been asleep at the wheel during 
the 1980s and as a result had achieved ‘a regulated, semi-decentralised approach… The 
employers were fairly slow to start with to clue into that.’ Then the Business Council of 
Australia (BCA) and other employer associations ‘decided they were going to intervene 




government in getting the reform agenda underway.’ They were joined in this by ‘the 
conservative governments and the conservatives in the bureaucracy, [who] got their act 
together to promote… deregulating the standards and the training systems, all those 
things start around 1993.’ Underneath it all Sutherland understands the employers’ 
fightback was motivated by an assessment that ‘the potential was emerging, the 
potential from the workers point of view.’ (Sutherland 1996, 15) 
 
Roe disagrees with his former metalworker colleagues’ assessment that enterprise 
bargaining ushered in the decline of training reform. He has continued his involvement 
in training reform when many others had departed and in 2003 was appointed to the 
ANTA Board. He believes training reform is an ongoing project. Another explanation 
was therefore necessary for why such a shift in direction occurred in the early 1990s. 
The government’s support for ‘privatisation, small government and other anti-worker 
policies’ came about because Labor ministers and key policy advisors were ‘captured’ 
by economic rationalists in the public sector and this had a great disorganising effect on 
the labour movement in general and training reform in particular. ‘Pusey’s work on the 
capture of the senior bureaucracy and the dominance of Treasury and Finance 
Department bureaucrats in the process is pretty critical. iv That’s clearly the experience 
of our union in trying to influence government policy in the period.’ (Roe 1997, 17, 6) 
 
Officers in the ACTU and NSW Labor Council also witnessed the swing towards 
greater business and bureaucratic influence. ‘Marlon’v was an officer with the NSW 
Labor Council and had also been a TUTA trainer, he saw ‘the training reform agenda 
got captured by what became known as the training reform bureaucracy.’ (Marlon 1997, 
5) It wasn’t that the activity changed according to Jane Carnegie, who went to work at 
the ACTU as an assistant to Laurie Carmichael, rather ‘the dimensions and the forces 
changed in that period of 1992/93 onwards where the government was responsive to 
perspectives other than the union movement’s. The BCA and ACCI (Australian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry) began coming out with views of their own and 
began to question some of the initiatives because they thought they were being 
disadvantaged.’ (Carnegie 1997, 10)   
 
As the pressure built on the ALP in the lead-up to what most believed was the 
unwinnable 1993 election the BCA, other employers and the conservative governments 
on the National Training Board made a concerted push ‘to completely unhitch the 
industrial and training agenda’ according to Cathy Bloch a TUTA trainer and former 
assistant General Secretary of the NSW Teachers Federation. Many in the labour 
movement expected Labor to lose and this generated an urgency to try to consolidate 
the structural changes that had been introduced since 1987. ‘Unhitching the requirement 
to link standards to classification structures as well as to awards marked for me a 
turning point. The unions, fearing that the National Training Board might be abolished, 
took a calculated risk that it was more important to maintain the fledgling system and so 
began a series of retreats.’ (Bloch 1997, 11) 
 
Once the system reverted to the control of the education bureaucracy ‘it just proved to 
be so slow. It got caught up in the entrails of the whole grinding educational process, 
there were so many consultants running around there was almost nothing being 




the enterprise bargaining environment that kind of vision of people having transferable 
and portable skills, and skills paths, which people’s imagination was very fired up by in 
the 80s and early 90s seems to have gone into sand… The union movement got more 
remote from it.’ (Bloch 1997, 11) 
 
For Bloch removing the link between training reform and awards changed it from being 
a powerful social agenda aimed at improving workers’ educational opportunities and 
modernising industry and the economy to a technical system full of structures and 
committees. Her frustration at educators not understanding this salient point led to 
frustration. ‘I used to have people from the TAFE sector explain the training reform 
agenda to me and they’d put MOVEET up there and they’d do this and they’d do that, 
and I’d say ‘but they’re structures to what purpose, what’s the reason for all of this, why 
are we doing it?’ And most TAFE people I came across, in my view, had no idea 
because the industrial stuff had just been excised, they were never told about it 
anyway.’ (Bloch 1997, 11) 
 
Accompanying this swing was a surge of new consulting businesses eager to take 
advantage of the intricacies involved in devising new competency standards, curriculum 
packages, classification systems, assessment procedures and so on.  Enterprise 
bargaining gave these emerging businesses an added boost because it was in their 
financial interests to promote the enterprise focus. ‘What is your reaction as a private 
consultant in the training industry to Enterprise Bargaining?’, asked Lloyd, ‘This is 
even bigger because this means that ICI will do something different to DuPont or Dow 
Chemicals. That’s great, custom designed systems.’ (Lloyd 1997, 23) 
 
 
Contradictions and critique 
 
Whether there was a precise moment or event that shifted the balance away from what 
the unions had hoped to achieve from training reform it is clear that it foundered on 
three essential and related contradictions and these came to a head in the early 1990s.  
 
Training reform’s link to industrial relations rested on the ongoing existence of a 
centralised arbitration and award system. Introducing a decentralised enterprise 
bargaining system undermined the national, industry focus and institutional 
arrangements that made labour’s training reform model possible. Ensuring that 
curriculum, standards and qualifications would be portable and recognised across 
industries and states was an important selling point of training reform and this was put 
at risk by a new commitment to enterprise outcomes. Finally, training reform advocates’ 
interventionist expectations for industry policy and industry development faltered on 
what they identified as the government’s commitment to a ‘deregulatory program.’ 
With this shift to a more neo-liberal agenda in the early 1990s ‘it was going to be very 
difficult to get support for a regulatory or interventionist VET regime.’ (Ewer 1997, 11) 
These contradictions reflected the critical divide between a national approach to reform 
and a free-market approach. 
 
From their vantage points in the metalworker’s research unit and the ACTU, Peter Ewer 




training reform. Their reflections reveal a sense of lost opportunity, disillusion but also 
a recognition that there were flaws in the model. Ewer believes that talk of a ‘high skill, 
high wage economy is simply a nonsense’, while Carnegie concluded that ‘the rhetoric 
of the high wage, high skill hasn’t come about at all. … The turning point for that was 
Working Nation (1994), a low skill, low wage industry policy.’ (Ewer 1997, 6; Carnegie 
1997, 12)   
 
The positive reasons for supporting training reform still retain their validity but the 
wider expectations that surrounded and supported it could not have been realised 
without confronting more fundamental inequalities. ‘Unless you are going to confront 
the distribution of a wider range of social inequalities rather than just training then 
income distribution is going to remain as polarised as it is now.’ Why then were those 
relations of power not taken into account? I’m never too sure whether the answer isn’t 
that the original project was never seen through or whether the original project was so 
fatally flawed it was incapable of being realised (…) Certainly, I think it is 
incontrovertible that the original model of award-based restructuring was never carried 
through to a satisfactory conclusion.’ (Ewer 1997, 6) 
 
The retreats and compromises had longer-term consequences as well. They reversed the 
original skill formation moves and laid the path for the Howard government to say ‘we 
need to price ourselves back into jobs and smash trade unions that stand in the way of 
us doing that. I think that confirms the trajectory that we consciously or otherwise put 
ourselves on through Training Reform.’ (Ewer 1997, 6) 
 
There is a further aspect to this turnaround that deserves closer attention. The consensus 
that was an essential feature of the Accord and subsequently training reform created a 
climate within the labour movement where critical questioning was at best frowned 
upon and too often actively suppressed.  
 
The accepted wisdom among training reform unionists that industry should lead 
education restructuring reflected a commitment to consensus politics but also 
simultaneously betrayed an unwillingness to confront head on just who would control 
workers’ education.  
 
Unions were deliberately vague on what was meant by ‘industry’. They used the term to 
mean tripartite arrangements, that is, business, government and unions co-operating in 
national and industry bodies. That was the modus operandi of the Labor government as 
well who came into office in 1983 with the Accord as the emblem of its commitment to 
‘consensus’.  
 
The way vocational education was delivered was an important focus of the change 
process because what was delivered was determined by educational institutions, which 
in practice meant TAFE. Leading unions and business were agreed that the control of 
curriculum and standards should be removed from the hands of educators and education 
unions. ‘The whole focus of the training system shifted, the relationship between who 
the training system serves changed dramatically’ with ‘the notion that industry really 
should take the lead role in determining the content outcomes, and those content 





Ewer’s comments above reveal unions did not ‘unpack the code’ hoping that their 
interpretation of what industry meant would continue unchallenged. The reluctance to 
openly advocate their interpretation coupled with an atmosphere within the labour 
movement that silenced dissent was a significant factor in disarming the movement’s 
ability to understand change as it occurred and equip itself to resist the employers’ 
intellectual and industrial offensive through the 1990s.  
 
These pressures for consensus with employers and the state for the ‘national interest’ 
were not new. In the early twentieth century the Australian labour movement 
‘effectively resisted the education in citizenship (associated with social harmony and 
efficiency) that sought to transform its industrial culture’. (Taksa 2003, 14) As the long 
post war economic boom ended the pressure on labour to deliver consensus was strong. 
It was possible to resist but it required political leadership to do so, and equally required 
political leadership to consent.vi 
 
Ensuring consensus was maintained involved taking harsh steps against both individuals 
and unions who expressed dissent or stepped outside prescribed union or industrial 
court guidelines. (Brown 2004) Buchanan and Pocock point to an intellectual and 
organisational legacy of policy atrophy that is directly connected to the ‘limited nature 
of debate’ within the labour movement. They concluded that ‘one of the greatest 
weaknesses of the Accord period was the limited nature of the debate about alternatives 




Inevitably there was a high price to pay for inhibiting discussion and debate. When 
business peak bodies and the state bureaucracies re-asserted their interests, and 
especially when Howard was elected, they quickly and easily reclaimed ‘industry’ to 
mean business and in so doing sidelined union involvement in vocational education 
reform. 
 
For more than a decade the ACTU and a handful of key unions created expectations that 
could not be delivered. The idea that workers’ earnings, job security and work 
satisfaction could be substantially improved by establishing a new training system 
without also tackling economic inequality and power in the workplace was illusory. The 
underlying problem with the project was the belief that a consensus between labour, the 
employers and government would modernise the Australian economy for mutual 
benefits. 
 
The system’s intended gains were not delivered or at best were unevenly realised. The 
growing polarisation in income, high levels of unemployment, increased job insecurity 
and changes in the labour market such as growing numbers of casual and part-time 
workers are examples that highlight there was little gain from the pain of restructuring. 
 
Many union officials most closely involved in developing the training reform agenda 




factor that killed union training reform as it uncoupled awards and training and set in 
train a deregulatory momentum that has since been consolidated.  
 
Suggestions that sustained advances could be achieved without confronting the issues of 
ownership and power and by avoiding conflict with the employing class were 
fundamentally flawed, and gradually contributed to the movement’s weakened position.  
 
New efforts are being made to revive union education to revitalise the movement (see 
for instance ACTU 1999, 2003a). In addition to the Organising Works program and the 
activities of the ACTU’s Organising Centre a new set of unionism competencies have 
been endorsed by the Business Services Industry Training Board. As well the Australian 
Manufacturing Workers Union have embarked on an ambitious competency based 
accredited program for its officials and a Trade Union Education Foundation (TUEF) 
has received the support of the ACTU and the NSW and Victorian governments. These 
are important initiatives although they are different in nature and scope to the systemic 
restructuring proposed by the training reform agenda. A comprehensive appraisal of that 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i  Two spellings of Labor and labour are used throughout this article. Labor is used for 
the political party, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and for the NSW Labor Council the peak 
trade union body in NSW. Labour is used as a generic term for the labour movement, which 
embraces the political and industrial organisations of the workers’ movement.  
ii  For an overview of the then contemporary mainstream Australian debate about 
responses to globalisation see EPAC 1995, Lepani et al 1995, and Latham 1998 for a more 
recent Labor version. 
iii  In the 1990s the AMWU was the Amalgamated Metal Workers Union. Today it is the 




                                                                                                                                               
iv  Roe is referring to Michael Pusey’s 1991 book Economic rationalism in Canberra: A 
nation building state changes its mind. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. 
v  Neither Marlon, Jack nor the Minister wished to be identified for this study and 
therefore pseudonyms have been used.  
vi  Ellen M Wood’s analysis of changes in the left’s understanding of class and socialism 
The retreat from class (1986) is invaluable in assessing Australian political rethinking during 
this period.  
 
 
